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Wireless sensor Networks (WSNs) deployed in distributed Internet of Things (IoT) applications should be integrated into the
Internet. According to the distributed architecture, sensor nodes measure data, process, exchange information, and perform
collaboratively with other sensor nodes and end-users, which can be internal or external to the network. In order to maintain
the trustworthy connectivity and the accessibility of distributed IoT, it is important to establish secure links for end-to-end
communication with a strong pervasive authentication mechanism. However, due to the resource constraints and heterogeneous
characteristics of the devices, traditional authentication and key management schemes are not effective for such applications.
This paper proposes a pervasive lightweight authentication and keying mechanism for WSNs in distributed IoT applications, in
which the sensor nodes can establish secured links with peer sensor nodes and end-users. The established authentication scheme
PAuthKey is based on implicit certificates and it provides application level end-to-end security. A comprehensive description for
the scenario based behavior of the protocol is presented. With the performance evaluation and the security analysis, it is justified
that the proposed scheme is viable to deploy in the resource constrained WSNs.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor network is a key technological building block
of Internet ofThings, which is considered the future evolution
of the Internet. During the past decade, WSN and its security
are not only well investigated amongst the industry and
academia [1] but also promoted with standardized security
solutions [2, 3]. Although the concept and applications of IoT
are not novel any longer, IoT security is still in its infancy.
However, substantial amount of research work has been done
to identify the challenges and possible protection mecha-
nisms for securing IoT, as shown throughout [4–7]. Never-
theless, IoT security protocols are still neither standardized
nor commercialized properly due to its novelty and imma-
turity. Since WSN is an indispensable part of the IoT, it
needs to adapt IP technologies to create a seamless and global
connectivity with the Internet [6]. The Internet engineering
task force (IETF) has contributed significantly to gaining
that pervasive connectivity of small objects to IPv6 based
Internet. IPv6 over low-power wireless personal area network
(6LoWPAN) enables complete integration of WSNs into the
Internet [8, 9]. Constrained application protocol (CoAP) and
routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL)
are, respectively, proposed for application layer and network
layer routing in constrained IoT networks [10, 11]. Physical
and MAC layers of low-power networks are defined by IEEE
802.15.4 protocol [2].
In the context of IoT application domains,WSN architec-
tures exist as centralized and distributed approaches [5]. In
the centralized approach, a central entity (or a cloud service)
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is responsible for acquiring raw data from the sensors, pro-
cessing received data into required information and format,
and providing information for other required entities (e.g.,
groups of companies and individual customers). In such
centralized networks, there is little or no support to access
the data sensing network devices directly. In contrast, the dis-
tributed networks allow the end-users and other network
entities to obtain raw data straightaway from the sensor
nodes. Unlike in the centralized approach, in distributed
architecture the edge network devices comprise high level
intelligence and processing power. Although provisioning of
services is located at the edge of the network, different appli-
cation platforms and end-users can collaborate dynamically
with each other. As a result of the decentralized and distri-
buted nature of the network, it is essential to consider the
secure management of identity and authentication of con-
necting devices. In IoT applications, multiple entities (e.g.,
sensing nodes, service providers, and information processing
systems) have to authenticate each other to establish a trusted
connection. Not only should the authentication protocols be
resistive and robust to malicious attacks, but also they should
be lightweight to be deployed in less performing edge devices
(i.e., sensors and actuators).
Rather used for genericWSN applications, IoT combined
WSN use-cases are widely deployed in smart-home, smart-
city, healthcare, and industry monitoring applications [5, 7,
12]. In a hospital environment, there can be different sensors
installed in monitoring health conditions of patients (e.g.,
blood pressure, heart beat, and oxygen concentration). Doc-
tors, who are outside the hospital, might be interested in
examining health records of particular patients. Similarly,
some medical machinery that maintains the environmental
conditions of the ward needs to get the same records. In
this scenario, as illustrated in Figure 1, doctors have to access
the sensor node as an end-user and the machinery has to
collaborate as a sensor node from the same or a distinctive
WSN. However, in both cases, the two communication par-
ties need to prove their authenticity to each other before
establishing a secure communication link.
In factory automation and power plant monitoring appli-
cations, WSNs are deployed inside the factory premises to
obtain raw data on machinery vibration, temperature, flow-
rate, and light intensity [12]. Their sensed data are used to
identify machine abnormalities and to create safety alarms.
There can be instances where the users inside and outside the
power plant want to acquire raw data directly from the sen-
sor nodes. The end-users and the sensor nodes have to auth-
enticate each other before transferring raw data.
Based on the explained scenarios and the state-of-the-art
before, the main contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows.
(i) We propose and design a pervasive authentication
protocol and a key establishment scheme for the
resource constrained WSNs in distributed IoT appli-
cation, called PAuthKey.
(ii) We implement the PAuthKey protocol and demon-
strate its performance measurements on the high
resource constrained sensor nodes.
(iii) We conduct a security analysis on PAuthKey, along
with performance and security comparisons between
it and DTLS scheme, which is currently considered
the most appropriate authentication scheme for con-
strained IoT networks.Moreover, we show the perfor-
mance comparison results of two phases of PAuthKey
with ECDSA and ECDH schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a brief overview about the related work. Section 3
comprehensively describes the system architecture, where the
authentication protocol is developed, and the notations used.
Section 4 presents the proposed authentication and keyman-
agement protocol known as PAuthKey. Section 5 gives a
detailed explanation about the implementation, performance
analysis, security analysis, and scalability of the PAuthKey
protocol. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
In centralizedWSN, data from the sensor nodes are transmit-
ted to a single central location, which processes information
and combines and provides information acquisition for end-
users (i.e., customers) [7]. Due to the high data availability
andmassive network size, processing of data on a single loca-
tion might be inefficient, congested, and undertaking a high
risk at single entity failure. In the distributed networks, the
sensor nodes can retrieve, process, and provide data for other
entities and end-users. Figure 1 provides an overview of the
distributed IoT approach, which allows the communication
among the edge devices, end-users, and IoT server cloud.
Distributed architecture supports the IoT network appli-
cations by providing services at local level and collaborating
with all the network devices and users to achieve common
goals. Due the network heterogeneity and device mobility,
there can be many security threats and issues encountered
with distributed IoT. In [7] Roman et al. have identified
security challenges in distributed IoT. According to their
study, network entity identity, authentication, access control,
and secure communication channel establishment are major
security concerns in distributed IoT. The proposed mecha-
nisms should be robust to node mobility and network scala-
bility due to the dynamic behavior of nodes. Additionally, the
network needs to scale up after installation.
Exploitation of a master key for entity authentication for
pervasive computing environments would be also a feasible
approach to IoT enabled WSNs [13]. According to [14], the
authentication mechanisms for WSN applications can be
summarized as password based, remote user authentication
using one-way hash functions and ticket based authentica-
tion. However, most of the work has the sole purpose of
enabling end-user authentication in generic WSN architec-
ture and it does not provide the extensibility for the key est-
ablishment. In [15, 16], the authors have proposed broadcast
authentication schemes forWSNs. Reference [14] presents an
effective authentication mechanism for ubiquitous collabo-
ration in heterogeneous computing environment. This is a
ticket based user authentication scheme, which is not appli-
cable to the high resource constrained devices due to large
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Figure 1: Overview of the distributed IoT approach in a hospital environment.
memory consumption. Nevertheless, these works have less or
almost zero contribution to securing IoT combined WSNs.
The reason is that they have less addressed network scalability
and device mobility issues.
DTLS is an adaptation of TLS protocol and it provides an
equal communication security as TLS for datagram protocols
[17]. According to [10], the secured version of CoAP (known
as CoAPs) is defined with DTLS due to the unreliable com-
munication links in CoAP based IoT networks. In [18], the
authors have introduced the first fully implemented two-way
authentication scheme for the IoT based on DTLS protocol.
However, due to the existence of eight message transfers to
complete DTLS handshake, it induces a significant overhead
to the network traffic.Themain drawback is the utilization of
X.509 certificates andRSApublic keys withDTLS handshake,
which are too heavy for the lowperforming and high resource
restricted sensor nodes.
Due to the high resource demand, public key crypto-
graphic (PKC) algorithms, such as RSA, are not recom-
mended for WSN applications. However, elliptic curve cryp-
tography (ECC) (i.e., a lightweight PKC alternative) based
security solutions are not anymore new toWSNs.The utiliza-
tion of implicit certificates for generating pairwise ephemeral
keys is yet an improving realm. There are several implicit
certificate generation schemes forWSNs presented in [19, 20].
Elliptic curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) is one of such schemes
embedded in ZigBee Smart Energy applications [21]. In [22],
a fully implemented end-to-end authentication scheme has
been introduced to the high constrained embedded devices.
TinyECC is a stable ECC implementation for constrained
network entities, where in [23] the authors provide imple-
mentation details and measurement results for elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) and Diffie-Hellman
key establishment (ECDH). Several ECC based security
schemes have been proposed for WSNs as published in [15,
19, 24–26].
3. System Model and Notations
In this section, the authors provide details about the system
architecture, where the protocol is modeled, and information
about the used notations.
3.1. System Model. Figure 2 illustrates the assumed network
architecture for the proposed authentication scheme, where
end-users can collaborate with different edge devices in order
to obtain particular information or service. The edge net-
works may include heterogeneous devices and the end-users
can be humans or virtual entities (e.g., web applications).
According to the distributed IoT architecture, end-users
and edge devices (i.e., sensor nodes) should possess the cap-
ability of securely accessing an edge device in a WSN.There-
fore, based on Figure 2, mutual authentication is considered
for four types of communication link establishments, partic-
ularly the following.
(1) Two sensor nodes are located in the same cluster
(Link A).
(2) Two sensor nodes are located in distinctive clusters in
the same WSN (Link B).
(3) Two sensor nodes are located in distinctive clusters
and in distinctive WSNs (Link C).
(4) An end-user is linked to a sensor node (Link D).
Before starting the actual authentication protocol
between twonetwork entities, it is necessary to undergo a reg-
istration process by every communication party in order to
retrieve cryptographic credentials. Later, the obtained sec-
urity credentials are to be exploited for mutual authentica-
tion. For the given four types of communication link possi-
bilities (1)–(4), every edge device and end-user have to
acquire security credentials (e.g., cryptographic suites and
implicit certificates) from a trusted third party such as a
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certificate authority (CA). It is assumed that the CA is a
highly resource-rich server and is already known by the edge
nodes during the registration phase.
In this architecture, two types of network entities such as
resource rich entities (i.e., end-users and cluster heads (CH))
and highly resource constrained network entities (i.e., sensor
nodes) are considered. Here, a cluster tree topology of WSNs
is assumed, where a CH is the controlling device for the sen-
sor nodes in a particular cluster. Therefore, it is considered
that CH is performing as the CA (i.e., to issue implicit
certificates) for the same group of sensor nodes in the cluster.
However, further details about the authentication between a
CH and an end-user (i.e., between two resource-rich entities)
are not provided in this paper. The major concerns are the
authentication between two constrained nodes or one con-
strained node and a resource-rich entity. Hence, it is assumed
that all the CHs and end-users advocate DTLS for secure
end-to-end communication after acquiring X.509 certificates
from a common CA. As aforementioned in Section 2, X.509
certificates are only handled by end-users and CHs, due
to their complexity and overhead on tiny sensor nodes. As
illustrated in Figure 2, resource-rich network entities (i.e.,
end-users and CHs) first communicate with the common CA
along the already established communication links heading
through an IoT cloud. If an end-user needs to communicate
with a sensor node with a particular cluster, first it needs to
establish a secure DTLS connection with the corresponding
CH and obtain implicit certificates from the CH. The end-
user can obtain the implicit certificate from the CH through
that secure link. Then, the end-user can use the obtained
implicit certificate to communicate with the sensor node.
Having a valid implicit certificate allows the two entities
for mutual authentication irrespective of their local network.
Existing nodes can change their locations dynamically after
requesting a new certificate. No matter what the size of the
network is, adding new nodes can easily extend the data
acquisition and service providing networks. It is assumed
that CH can recognize the valid identities and communicate
with the network entities, which are requesting security
credentials [27]. The reason is that the CH has to verify
the certificate requestor’s identity at the beginning of the
handshake and it performs the verification mainly based on
the identity of the requestor node. The IPv6 over low-power
wireless personal area network (6LoWPAN) identities are
considered for the identification. In this paper, an end-to-
end authentication is proposed for the application layer, while
relying on the security schemes provided from the physical
and MAC layers in IEEE802.15.4 standard [2]. Subsequently,
the edge devices and end-users can mutually authenticate
and establish secure communication channels, due to the
distributive nature of the entire architecture.
3.2. Notations. The notations used in this paper are defined
in Table 1. Elliptic curve (EC) parameters are denoted by
𝑞, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛. The variable 𝑞 is a prime, which indicates finite
field 𝐹𝑞. The variables 𝑎 and 𝑏 are coefficients of EC 𝑦
2 =
𝑥3+𝑎𝑥+𝑏, where 4𝑎3+27𝑏2 ̸= 0.𝐺 is the base point generator
with order of 𝑛, which is also a prime [28].
4. PAuthKey Work Flow
The PAuthKey protocol mainly consists of two phases: regis-
tration phase and authentication phase. During the registra-
tion phase, the sensor nodes in a particular cluster should
obtain certificates from the CH and derive their own public-
private key pairs. The authentication phase is varying upon
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Table 1: Notations used in cryptographic algorithms.
Notations Description
𝐾
Network-wide symmetric key for initial message
authentication
𝑟
𝑈
Secret random integer value generated by 𝑈
𝑅
𝑈
EC point for certificate request sent by node 𝑈
Cert
𝑈
Implicit certificate of 𝑈th node
𝑒 Integer used to keep hash value of Cert
𝑈
𝑠
Integer used to compute private key of the requestor
node
𝑑
𝑈
Node 𝑈’s private key
𝑄
𝑈
Node 𝑈’s public key
𝑁
𝑈
Random cryptographic nonce generated by node 𝑈
𝐾
𝑈𝑉
Link key between nodes 𝑈 and 𝑉
the type of the communication link between the end-parties
(i.e., four communication link possibilities as explained in
Section 3). Accordingly, the authentication phase is des-
cribed for three scenarios with reference to the systemmodel
in Figure 2: scenario 1 for link A, scenario 2 for links B and
C, and scenario 3 for link D. The upcoming subsections cha-
racterize the phases individually.
4.1. Registration Phase (Initial Certificate Acquisition). Ini-
tially, the sensor nodes should obtain security credentials
from their respective cluster head (CH) as a prerequisite
for the actual authentication protocol. All the sensors in a
particular cluster consider their certificate authority (CA) as
the CH. Upon the certificate request from sensor node 𝑈,
the CA generates the certificate. The message flow of the
certificate acquisition is illustrated in Figure 3.The grey boxes
show the change of variables and the white boxes indicate the
performed functionality by the entity.
The handshake starts with the Requestor Hello mes-
sage, 6LoWPAN node identity (𝑈), and cipher suites that
are supported by the requestor. The cipher suites are com-
mon for all the edge devices and would include the available
cipher options on the requestor, for example, CERT ECC
160 WITH AES 128 SHA1 requests for certificates in 160-bit
EC curves, 128-bit AES for bulk encryption, and SHA1 for
hashing. It is assumed that the cipher suites are installed on
the sensor nodes during the offline mode before the deploy-
ment. CAuses 6LoWPANnode identity to figure out whether
it is a valid request from a node that belongs to its clus-
ter. If the requestor identity verification is successful, CA
agrees to one cipher suite from the received options and
sends CA Hello message with its public key 𝑄CA as an
unprotected message to approve the initiation of the hand-
shake.
Upon receiving CA Hello message, the requestor gen-
erates a certificate request EC point 𝑅𝑈. While creating a
certificate request, first, the node generates a randomnumber
𝑟𝑈 ∈ [1, . . . , 𝑛 − 1] and computes 𝑅𝑈 = 𝑟𝑈 × 𝐺. The prede-
fined EC domain parameters are used according to the nego-
tiated cipher suite. Second, the node produces a randomcryp-
tographic nonce𝑁𝑈, calculates message authentication code
(MAC) value (i.e., MAC[𝑅𝑈, 𝑈,𝑁𝑈]), and sends those two
along with the Certificate Request message. The CA
generates theMACvalue using the commonmessage authen-
tication key 𝐾, which is mentioned in the cipher suite. The
random cryptographic nonce is used to ensure the freshness
of the message.
After receiving the certificate request, CA verifies the
MAC value and nonce 𝑁𝑈 in order to identify the integrity
and the freshness of it. If the verification is successful, CA
computes the certificate Cert𝑈 and private key reconstruction
value 𝑠 for the requestor node 𝑈. During this process, CA
first generates a random number 𝑟CA ∈ [1, . . . , 𝑛 − 1] and
computes the certificate Cert𝑈 = 𝑅𝑈 + 𝑟CA × 𝐺. Then, CA
calculates 𝑠 using Cert𝑈, 𝑟CA, and its own private key 𝑑CA;
𝑒 = 𝐻(Cert𝑈) and 𝑠 = 𝑒𝑟CA + 𝑑CA(mod 𝑛). The value 𝑒
should be computed using the one-way cryptographic hash-
ing function, which is mentioned in the cipher suite (e.g.,
SHA1). Later, the CA sends the Certificate message that
includes the certificate Cert𝑈, 𝑠, a random nonce 𝑁CA, and
the MAC on [Cert𝑈, 𝑠, 𝑁CA].
While receiving this message, the requestor node 𝑈 first
verifies the MAC and 𝑁CA. If they are correct, 𝑈 calculates
𝑒 = 𝐻(Cert𝑈) using the same hash function. Then, the node
𝑈 can compute its own private key 𝑑𝑈 = 𝑒𝑟𝑈 + 𝑠(mod 𝑛) and
public key 𝑄𝑈 = 𝑑𝑈 × 𝐺.
Node 𝑈’s Finished message contains an encrypted
message digest of previous handshake messages using the
requestor public key 𝑄𝑈. According to the EC arithmetic
operations which are performed for calculating keys [10],
CA is also capable of computing 𝑈’s public key 𝑄𝑈; 𝑄𝑈 =
𝑒Cert𝑈+𝑄CA.The following derivation proves that both equa-
tions give exactly the same 𝑄𝑈 as computed by node 𝑈:
𝑄𝑈 = 𝑑𝑈𝐺 = (𝑒𝑟𝑈 + 𝑠 (mod 𝑛)) 𝐺
= (𝑒𝑟𝑈 + 𝑒𝑟CA + 𝑑𝐶𝐴 (mod 𝑛)) 𝐺
= 𝑒 (𝑟𝑈 + 𝑟CA (mod 𝑛)) 𝐺 + 𝑑CA𝐺
= 𝑒 (𝑟𝑈𝐺 + 𝑟CA𝐺) + 𝑄CA
= 𝑒 (𝑅𝑈 + 𝑟CA𝐺) + 𝑄CA
= 𝑒Cert𝑈 + 𝑄CA.
(1)
CA uses public key 𝑄𝑈 for encrypting previous messages
and answers with the Finished message to complete the
handshake of the preauthentication phase.
At the end of the registration phase, the sensor nodes pos-
sess the security credentials to start secure communication
with the internal and the external network entities (i.e., end-
users and sensor nodes).
4.2. Authentication Phase. The authentication phase is de-
scribed for three scenarios. Scenario 1 (Link A) is the authen-
tication between two sensor nodes in the same cluster. Parts
of scenario 2 (Link B and C) and scenario 3 (Link D) also
include the principal handshake of scenario 1. Scenario 2 is
the authentication between two sensor nodes in distinctive
clusters in the same or different WSN. Scenario 3 is the auth-
entication between a sensor node and an end-user. These
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Figure 3: Message flow for the registration phase.
scenarios resemble the communication link possibilities,
which are shown in Figure 2.
Scenario 1: Authentication Process between Two Sensor Nodes
in the Same Cluster. The first scenario is the exploitation of
certificates and public-private keys for node authentication
between two sensor nodes in the same cluster. Since the
sensor nodes in a particular cluster obtain security credentials
from a common CA, they can easily carry out the mutual
authentication as depicted in Figure 4. The grey boxes are
value ranges and the white boxes are performed operations.
The client node 𝑈 is aware of the 6LoWPAN identity of the
server node V, which 𝑈 needs to acquire the data or the ser-
vice. As the initial step, the client sends the Client Hello
message accompanied with its identity 𝑈 to the server node.
The server replies with the Server Hello message along
with the cipher suites it supports and CH’s identity, which
is the CA for both nodes. If the client does not have the
security credentials from the given cipher suite, it has to
retrieve them from theCA.Otherwise, the client can continue
the handshake by sending its certificate Cert𝑈. Similar to the
registration phase handshake, random cryptographic nonce
𝑁𝑈 and MAC values are used in order to preserve the
freshness and integrity of the message.
Upon receiving the client’s certificate, the server first veri-
fies the MAC value and then computes the client’s public key
𝑄𝑈 using its certificate; 𝑒 = 𝐻(Cert𝑈) and 𝑄𝑈 = 𝑒Cert𝑈 +
𝑄CA. This is proven according to (1). Then, the server 𝑉
generates a random nonce𝑁𝑉 and sends it along with Cert𝑉
and MAC𝐾[Cert𝑉, 𝑁𝑉, 𝑉]. In the meantime, the server 𝑉
computes the pairwise key 𝐾𝑈𝑉 from its private key 𝑑𝑉 and
U’s public key 𝑄𝑈, where 𝐾𝑈𝑉 = 𝑑𝑉𝑄𝑈. Similar to the server
V, upon receiving the message, the client𝑈 verifies the MAC
and if the verification is successful it computes𝑄𝑉 and𝐾𝑈𝑉 =
𝑑𝑈𝑄𝑉.Therefore, at the end of two-waymessage transferring,
both parties can derive a common pairwise key for actual
secure communication.
Finally, the exchange of the Finished messages con-
cludes the handshake. This Finished message is composed
of previous handshake messages, which are encrypted by the
common key 𝐾𝑈𝑉. At the end of six message transfers, the
two edge nodes can authenticate each other and establish a
common secret key and a secure communication link that
can be used for securing further data acquisitions between
the client and the server.
Scenario 2: Authentication Process between Two Sensor Nodes
in Distinctive Clusters. Here, the node authentication process
is demonstrated between two sensor nodes located in distinc-
tive clusters, whichmight be in the sameor differentWSNs. In
such cases, the nodes cannot use their certificates for mutual
authentication since they are generated from two CAs. The
messages flow of the authentication protocol is illustrated in
Figure 5.
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Figure 4: Message flow for scenario 1—authentication process between two sensor nodes in the same cluster.
Similar to scenario 1, the preliminary Hello mes-
sage exchange initiates the handshake. Upon receiving
the Server Hellomessage, the client checks the identity of
the CH corresponding to the server and verifies the necessity
of requesting a new certificate from the given CH. The client
𝑈 is unable to communicate with CH𝑉 directly and it obtains
the security credentials through its own cluster head CH𝑈.
The client forwards the cipher suite and CH identity to its
cluster headCH𝑈. CH𝑈 communicateswithCH𝑉 on behalf of
the node𝑈 and requests the security credentials. As explained
in the system model, it is assumed that two cluster heads
initiate a secure communication link using RSA keys and
DTLS handshake [18]. Though CH𝑉 does not communicate
with the node 𝑈 directly, it grants the certificate by being
the CA for the node 𝑈. The new certificate request and
the certificate are exchanged through that established secure
channel. Additionally, CH𝑉 sends its public key𝑄
∗
CA to CH𝑈,
which is used by 𝑈 during further computations. Then, CH𝑈
computes the new public-private keys 𝑄∗
𝑈
and 𝑑∗
𝑈
of node
U and sends the certificate Cert∗
𝑈
and the keys (i.e., 𝑄∗
𝑈
,
𝑑∗
𝑈
, and 𝑄∗CA) to the node 𝑈. The security credentials are
encrypted by U’s primal public key 𝑄𝑈. After having the
required security credentials from the new CA (i.e., cluster
head of node𝑉), the client𝑈 can continue the authentication
protocol as described in scenario 1 handshake.
Scenario 3: Authentication Process between End-User and
Sensor Node. Figure 6 demonstrates the flow of the message
transactions of the authentication process between an end-
user and a sensor node. The difference between scenario 3
and scenario 2 is that here the user directly retrieves security
credentials from the given cluster head. However, in scenario
2, the two cluster heads have to communicate first for the
acquisition of the implicit certificate for the client node.
Similar to the previous case (i.e., scenario 2), it is assumed that
the secure link between the user and the CH is established
with RSA keys and DTLS handshake [18], and the security
credentials are transmitted over that link. Once the end-user
obtains the certificate and computes its public-private keys,
the rest of the handshake would occur in a similar manner as
scenarios 1 and 2.
As explained in the above three scenarios, the end-users
and the sensor nodes can establish secure communication
links after authenticating each other using implicit certifi-
cates. Furthermore, the two-party authenticationmechanism
enables the nodes to generate a pairwise common secret key.
Therefore, thiswould advocate accessing the data and services
in WSNs accommodated in distributed IoT architecture.
5. Analytical Justification of PAuthKey
In this section, a comprehensive analysis of the proposed
PAuthKey protocol is presented. The performance analysis
is given in terms of memory, energy consumption, and exe-
cution time, along with the support for network scalability.
8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
Client (U) Server (V)Cluster head of U Cluster head of V
Certificate authority (CA)
Client hello, U
Server hello, cipher suite, CH identity
Cipher suite, CH identity
Certificate request-RU
DTLS based secure connection
Certificate-CertU
Generate certificate request
Verify MAC
Verify MAC
Generate certificate
rU𝜖R[1, , n − 1]
RU = rUG
Generate NU
rCA𝜖R[1, , n − 1]
CertU = RU + rCAG
e = H(CertU)
s = erCA + dCA(mod n)
Finished
Finished
Calculate MACK[CertU, U,NU]
∗
{Q
∗
U, d
∗
U, Q
∗
CA ,Cert
∗
U}
Cert∗U,NU,MACK[Cert
∗
U, U,NU]
QV = eCertV + QCA
e = H(CertV)
KUV = d
∗
UQV = dVd
∗
UG
KUV = dVQ
∗
QV = eCertV + QCA
e = H(CertV)
∗
∗∗∗
U = dVd
∗
UG
CertV,NV,MACK[CertV, V,NV]
Calculate MACK[CertU, s, NV]
Generate NV
. . .
. . .
Figure 5: Message flow for scenario 2—authentication process between two sensor nodes in distinctive clusters.
Next, the security of the protocol and the comparisons with
the related work are discussed.
5.1. Performance Analysis. Physical and MAC layer security
protocols do not provide end-to-end communication sec-
urity. DTLS is the widely used application level security
protocol for authentication in IoT networks. Variants of
DTLS handshakes are based on ECC and used with RSA and
X.509 certificates [22]. Although the exploitations of RSA and
X.509 certificates with DTLS provide interoperability, they
are hardly utilized by the high resource constrained devices
(e.g., sensors). The major drawbacks are as follows.
(1) RSA has a key size of 2048 bits.
(2) Standard X.509 certificates are in the order of 1 kB in
size.
(3) The utilization of RSA and X.509 on constrained sen-
sors consumes resources and induces computation
overhead.
The PAuthKey solution is implemented on a simple
network with TelosB sensor nodes [29] that have IEEE
802.15.4 compliant CC2420 RF transceivers. The hardware
includes 8MHz, 16-bit MCU with 10 Kbyte RAM and 48
Kbyte ROM. CC2420 RF transceiver has a maximum data
rate of 250 kbps and frequency band of 2400MHz [29].
PAuthKey is developed in NesC on TinyOS 2.1.2 [30]. ECC
(i.e., for EC arithmetic operations) and natural number (NN)
(i.e., for large natural number operations) interfaces are
utilized from TinyECC configurable library [23]. secp160r1
EC domain parameters are used as defined in [28]. The
authors of this paper utilized EC optimization techniques
provided in TinyECC such as Barrett reduction to speed up
modulo operations, Hybrid Multiplication and Squaring for
integermultiplication,Projective Coordinate Systems for point
addition, and SlidingWindow for scalarmultiplication. SHA-1
is used as the one-way cryptographic function𝐻. ECC oper-
ations are extremely costly compared to other cryptographic
operations (i.e., SHA-1 and MAC) [23]. Therefore, we have
considered the given EC operation optimization techniques.
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Figure 6: Message flow for scenario 3—authentication process between end-user and sensor node.
The experimental setup comprises three TelosB nodes,
one as the CA and the rest as the cluster nodes. For the sake of
simplicity and comparison, CA functionalities are also imple-
mented on the sensor node itself. The measurements are
taken in terms of execution time, energy, and memory (i.e.,
RAM and ROM) consumption. The check size.pl script is
used to obtain memory consumption values (e.g., for RAM
and ROM) required by each operation in registration phase
and authentication phase for scenario 1. The execution times
are measured directly on the sensor nodes and the energy
consumptions are computed using the runtime. The energy
consumptions are then calculated as𝑉×𝐼×𝑡 based on the volt-
age (𝑉), the current (𝐼), and the execution time (𝑡) on TelosB
sensor nodes [29]. Similar to [23], it is also considered that
the static values given in [29] are𝑉 = 3 volts and 𝐼 = 1.8mA.
Table 2: Memory utilization.
RAM (bytes) ROM (bytes)
Registration phase
Edge node operations 1410 11774
CA operations 2332 16576
Authentication phase
Operations at one edge node for
scenario 1 1530 11650
As given in Table 2, memory utilization values are taken
for two phases with respect to the communicating nodes.
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Table 3: Execution time and energy consumption.
Operation Time (ms) Energy (mJ)
Registration phase
At the sensor node side
Initialization 2709 14.6286
Cert Req generation 2764 14.9256
Cert verification 2758 14.8932
Finishedmsg computation 4 0.0216
At the CA side
Initialization 2709 14.6286
Cert generation 5728 30.9312
Finishedmsg computation 2154 11.6316
Authentication phase (scenario 1)
At the client or the server side
Initialization 2672 14.4288
Key computation 5768 31.1472
Finishedmsg computation 4 0.0216
For the registration phase, the total memory consump-
tion is measured for edge node operations (i.e., certificate
requestor) and CA operations. Edge node operations include
the generations of Requestor Hello, Certificate
Request, and Finished messages, certificate verification,
and public-private key computation at the sensor node side.
Similarly, CA operations include the generation of CA
Hello, Certificate, and Finishedmessages and Certi-
ficate Request verification.
For the authentication phase, scenario 1 was only consid-
ered, since it is almost similar to the major overhead created
at the sensor node side for the other scenarios. According to
the message flow of the authentication phase (i.e., scenario
1 in Figure 4), the collective operations performed at the
client and the server sides are identical. Therefore, the opera-
tions at one edge node include the generation of Hello
and Finished messages, MAC computation and verifica-
tion, public key calculation, and the derivation of the com-
mon secret key. As a result, the two phases of the protocol
collaboratively consume 2940 bytes of RAM and 23424 bytes
of ROM. However, the overall implementation of two phases
is still below the 10 kB RAM and 48 kB ROM provided by
the high resource constrained TelosB sensor nodes. Although
the memory consumption is higher for CA operations, in the
real-time deployment it would be tolerable for a resource-rich
device.
Since the transmission time depends on the size of the
network and the distance between the nodes, only the execu-
tion time for the particular operations performed at the edge
nodes and CA is measured for the registration and authen-
tication phases for scenario 1. The measured execution time
values and the calculated energy consumption values are
depicted in Table 3.
During the registration phase, the approximate collective
time utilization at certificate requestor’s (i.e., the sensor node)
side is 8235ms. This value includes the execution times
for initialization (2709ms), certificate request generation
(2764ms), certificate verification (i.e., private-public key
derivation) (2758ms), and Finished message computation
(4ms). At CA’s side, the execution time values are taken
for initialization (2709ms), certificate generation (5728ms),
and Finished message computation (2154ms). Altogether,
CA spends 10591ms for its operations under the registration
phase. At CA’s side, the Finishedmessage computation has
a higher execution time due to the derivation of the public key
of the sensor node (i.e., EC operation 𝑄𝑈 = 𝑒Cert𝑈 + 𝑄𝐶𝐴).
During the authentication phase for scenario 1, each
edge node (i.e., the client or the server) takes approximately
8444ms for initialization, key computation, and Finished
message computation. For the same operations, we have
calculated the energy consumptions at TelosBnodes using𝑉×
𝐼×𝑡. According to the computed values, a TelosB sensor node
consumes nearly 44.47mJ and 45.6mJ for registration and
authentication phases (for scenario 1), respectively. However,
these timing, energy, and memory values can be improved
by using further optimized basic ECC arithmetic operations.
All in all, experimental results show that the proposed
authentication mechanism can be easily deployed in low-
power less performing devices.
In the proposed two-phase authentication protocol,
implicit certificates, which are 160-bit EC points instead of
X.509 certificates, were used. Therefore, the size of the cer-
tificate is only 44 bytes. Using optimally designed EC curves
we can reduce the certificate size and using compression
techniques we can further decrease the overall message size.
Retransmission clocks can be used at both communicating
parties for identifying timeouts and retransmitting when
there is a message loss. Furthermore, the authentication
protocol supports scaling up the network, since the newly
added nodes can authenticate themselves after undergoing
the registration phase. As the certificates are not based on the
physical locations of the edge devices, they do not have to be
alternated according to nodes’ mobility.
5.2. Scalability. The proposed authentication protocol sup-
ports the scalability of the network (i.e., expanding the
network with new node addition) and the location changes of
the sensor nodes within the same cluster. When a new node
is added to the network, a valid 6LoWPAN node identity,
𝐾 message authentication key, and cipher suites should be
stored while the node is at offline mode. Figure 7 illustrates
how PAuthKey protocol supports a new node addition to the
network, within a particular cluster. It is illustrated as a three-
stage process. In Stage 1, at the bootstrapping phase, the newly
added node (marked as red rectangular shaped) can send the
certificate request and obtain a certificate from the CA for
computing its own keys. Hence, the size of the network is not
necessary to be predefined during the initial design phase and
deployment phase. At a new node request, the CA only needs
to verify the validity of the sensor node identities to issue the
certificate. In Stage 2, the new node receives its certificate.
Therefore, Stages 1 and 2 resemble the registration phase of
PAuthKey protocol. Finally in Stage 3, the node can undergo
the authentication phase and the key establishment using the
received certificate.
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Cluster head
(CH)
Certificate request
Certificate
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Figure 7: Behavior of the protocol when a new sensor node enters the cluster.
Similarly, the sensor nodes do not need prior knowledge
of their neighbors. Whenever a new node is added to the
network or changes the neighboring set, it can establish
the ephemeral pairwise link keys with the corresponding
neighbors using the certificate.The certificates always provide
an implicit assurance for the sensor nodes that they are legit-
imate nodes. Even though the sensor nodes are frequently
changing their locations (i.e., also the neighboring set), they
can authenticate themselves and derive the pairwise keys
securely without previous awareness of the new neighboring
nodes or end-users. As shown in [31], if the authentication is
performed based on pairwise keys between neighbors which
are preinstalled, then there should be a large number of stored
keys per node, which may not be desirable for large scale
networks. However, in PAuthKey protocol, such a large scale
key preinstallation is not needed at all since the ephemeral
link keys have to be established before starting communica-
tion.
5.3. Security Analysis. Theproposed implicit certificate based
authentication protocol is developed using one of the lightest
PKC schemes, ECC.Though it is comparatively more expen-
sive than symmetric key algorithms, it is inherently secured
due to the PKC characteristics.However, as shown in Sections
5.1 and 5.2, the proposed scheme is feasible to deploy in real-
time WSNs. While using EC scalar-point multiplication, the
scheme is provably secured under the random oracle model
that the discrete logarithm problem over the subgroup is
intractable. The advantage of using ECC is that it provides
an equal security as RSA, however, with less overhead (e.g.,
160-bit ECC equals RSA with 1024 key size). At the end of the
authentication scheme there is a key establishment partwhich
extends the security strength of the standard ECDH key
agreement by using mutually authenticated keying materials
(i.e., Cert𝑈 and s). Since the authentication is performed
using the implicit certificates of edge devices or users and
the link keys are derived using two preevaluated values (i.e.,
𝑑𝑈 and𝑄𝑉), the legitimacy and trust between two parties are
implicitly assured.
It is very common that denial of service (DoS) attacks
can be launched against distributed IoT. Moreover, during
the registration phase, the first Hello message contains the
certificate requestor’s identity, which is analyzed by CA. If
the unauthorized requestors are trying to access, the CA can
identify them at the beginning of identity verification and
protect itself from DoS attacks. Similarly, during the authen-
tication phase, the cryptographic credentials are exchanged
only after the successful Hello message exchange, which
provides protection from DoS attacks. In order to overcome
illegal message alternations by malicious users and DoS
attacks, the subsequent messages contain MAC with the
common authentication key 𝐾 for preserving data integrity.
The availability of the proposed protocol is ensured by
giving permission to two legitimate nodes, which possess
the certificates granted from the CA, to authenticate each
other and establish a secure pairwise key for their mutual
communication. The freshness of the messages is guaranteed
by appending true nonce. In the registration phase, the
originator of the certificate (i.e., CA) cannot deny being sent
the message (i.e., nonrepudiation property), since the CA
uses its key pair to generate the certificate and private key
reconstruction value (𝑠). Likewise, during the authentication
phase, the sender of the messages cannot deny that the
messages are sent by itself since the receiver always uses the
certificate of the sender to derive its (i.e., the sender’s) public
key.
In the security analysis, we are considering three attacks
including node compromising attacks, masquerade attacks,
and impersonate attacks. In node compromising attacks,
an adversary can physically capture a node and obtain its
keys. Similarly, in the authentication phase, an attacker can
impersonate a legitimate sensor node using its certificate or
try to masquerade the key establishment between two legi-
timate nodes.
5.3.1. Node Compromise Attacks. PAuthKey is resilient to
node compromise attacks. If a sensor node 𝑈 is captured,
the adversary can reveal Cert𝑈, 𝑄𝑈, 𝑑𝑈, and 𝑄CA. However,
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with CA’s public key, an adversary cannot create a new valid
certificate and private key reconstruction data, since they
are derived using 𝑑CA, which is only known to CA. Though
a node pretends to be a forgery CA and issues certificates
with 𝑄CA, eventually the fake certificates and public keys are
disclosed during the key establishment in the authentication
phase (i.e., calculating 𝐾𝑈𝑉 = 𝑑𝑈𝑄𝑉). We assume that the
CH can identify compromised nodes using beacon message
technique, as explained in [20, 32]. Then, CA will broadcast
the compromised node ID to the noncompromised nodes
within its cluster and the other CHs and end-users, those
who have contacted the CA for acquiring certificates to
communicate with that compromised node. Upon receiving
the CA’s message (i.e., compromised node ID), the other
sensor nodes, CHs, and end-users will discard or order to
demolish the certificate of the corresponding node and the
preestablished pairwise keys. Then, the compromised node
cannot appear by itself as a legitimate node in the future
because its certificate and user ID are already abandoned by
the legitimate users.
5.3.2. Impersonation and Masquerade Attacks. During the
key establishment in the authentication phase, nodes are
authenticated in order to prevent impersonation attacks and
masquerade attacks. Node 𝑉 computes node U’s public key
using its Cert𝑈 and the CA’s public key 𝑄CA. The pairwise
key 𝐾𝑈𝑉 calculation at both ends will be the same, only if
the certificates are issued by the identical valid CA.Therefore,
node 𝑉 has an implicit assurance that the received certificate
is genuine (i.e., issued by the CA). Likewise, when two legiti-
mate nodes initiate a pairwise key, an attacker (without a valid
certificate) cannot come in between them and masquerade
the key establishment. Since the pairwise key is derived on
the basis of certificates and private keys of both parties, an
attacker is impossible to proceed in it by only using a valid
certificate.
5.4. Comparison with Related Work. In this paper, the focus
was on authenticating the extreme resource constrained
devices, which are deployed inWSNs in distributed IoT appli-
cations. Therefore, the proposed authentication protocol was
implemented on TelosB sensor nodes and performance mea-
surements were obtained. However, as explained in Section
2, DTLS is considered the prominent authentication protocol
for IoT applications. Though we use DTLS in the middle of
PAuthKey protocol for certain scenarios (i.e., scenarios 2 and
3), the key foundation of the proposed authentication scheme
is explained in scenario 1. In particular, in scenarios 2 and 3,
DTLS is also utilized by resource-rich entities such as CHs
and end-users for authentication.
As aforementioned in Sections 2 and 4, PAuthKey scheme
is inspired by different ECC based security schemes. Among
them, ECDSA and ECDH are the most relevant schemes
to two phases of PAuthKey protocol. Therefore, the first
assessment includes the assessment of PAuthKey schemewith
the related work as depicted in Table 4. The memory and
timing values of ECDSA digital signature scheme are com-
pared with those of the registrations phase. Similarly, ECDH
key establishment performance is contrasted with the key
Table 4: Comparison of PAuthKey, ECDSA, and ECDH schemes.
RAM
(bytes)
ROM
(bytes)
Time
(ms)
Registration phase
At the sensor node side 1410 11774 8231
At the CA side 2332 16576 8437
ECDSA scheme [23] 1586 12640 14789
Authentication phase (scenario 1)
Key computation 1530 11650 5768
ECDH scheme [23] 1866 12102 6146
Table 5: Comparison of PAuthKey and DTLS scheme.
DTLS scheme [18] PAuthKey scheme
(for scenario 1)
Memory consumption
ROM 67 kB 22.875 kB
RAM 20 kB 2.871 kB
Time for authentication 4000ms 8444ms
Energy for authentication 939mj 45.59mj
Key size 2048 bits (RSA) 160 bits (ECC)
computation of the authentication phase. All the empirical
results are measured on TelosB sensor nodes and with the
activation ECC optimization techniques as mentioned in
Section 5.1.
According to the given experimental results, the registra-
tion phase of PAuthKey scheme at the sensor node side con-
sumes less memory than ECDSA scheme. Although the pro-
posed scheme consumes higher memory values than ECDSA
scheme, it would be tolerable for a resource-rich device.
However, the execution times of registration phase at both
ends (i.e., sensor node and CA) are less than the conven-
tional ECDSA scheme. Similarly, the key computation of
the authentication phase utilizes less memory and time than
the ECDH scheme. In security aspects, conventional ECDH
scheme is vulnerable to impersonation and masquerade
attacks, since two communication parties do not have an
authentication phase during the key establishment. However,
the proposed key establishment is well secured at both types
of attacks. Therefore, the given comparison results witness
higher performing capability of PAuthKey scheme in the
resource constrained sensor nodes than ECDSA and ECDH
schemes.
The second assessment presents the comparison results
between PAuthKey scheme and conventional DTLS scheme.
Thereby, the appropriateness of the proposed protocol for
the high resource restricted sensor nodes in WSNs is shown.
We use the empirical values, which indicate the performance
of DTLS, as given in [18] and the experimental results for
PAuthKey. Table 5 shows the comparison results between
DTLS scheme and PAuthKey authenticationmechanism (i.e.,
for scenario 1).
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The memory utilizations of PAuthKey are much better
than the conventional DTLS scheme. This is a convinc-
ing remark, which confirms the applicability of PAuthKey
scheme for the high resource constrained sensor nodes. Simi-
larly, energy consumption for the authentication in PAuthKey
scheme is notably fitting with low-power devices. According
to the experimental results, the total time consumption for
PAuthKey authentication is nearly double the value of DTLS
authentication. However, this can be further reduced by
using optimized EC arithmetic operations. Therefore, the
authors of this paper believe that the proposed solution
PAuthKey extends the existing pool of security solutions con-
cerned with ECC and can optimize the key establishment in
WSNs.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, the authors have introduced and analyzed an
authentication and key establishment mechanism for WSNs
in distributed IoT applications. The proposed PAuthKey
protocol comprises two phases: registration phase for obtain-
ing cryptographic credentials to the edge devices and end-
users and authentication phase for authentication and key
establishment in mutual communication.The authentication
phase is described for three distinctive scenarios, based on
the links between two communicating parties. Using PAu-
thKey protocols, the end-users can authenticate themselves
to the sensor nodes directly and acquire sensed data and
services. With the experimental results, it is shown that
the authentication protocol is feasible to deploy in the low
performing resource constrained network devices in WSNs.
The protocol supports the distributed IoT applications, since
the certificates are lightweight and can be handled by the high
resource constrained devices, irrespective of their originality.
According to the security analysis, the PAuthKey scheme
is secured under certain types of attacks. Finally, a brief
comparison between the conventional DTLS scheme and the
proposed PAuthKey protocol is presented. This shows the
appropriateness of PAuthKey scheme especially on the high
resource constrained devices.
In the future, the authors intend to extend the utilization
of implicit certificates for access control and multicasting in
the massive scale distributed IoT network applications. It is
expected to customize the content of the implicit certificates
by adding other information, such as the time stamp, location
identity, or 6LoWPAN identity, depending upon the applica-
tion requirements. Furthermore, it is intended to extend the
utilization of implicit certificates for group key management
in large scale sensor networks.
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